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"independence" of what is known from the "conscious experience of the knower" is one of its fundamental postulates. But such independence is understood by pragmatism according to the *requirements of reality,* not of *words.* Therefore, the independent object is independent and trans-subjective in the sense that it is *free to enter or leave* "conscious experience," but not in the completely agnostic and nihilistic sense that a mind may never directly encounter it at all. If Professor Montague means the latter relation to obtain between knowledge and its object, I agree that a pragmatist can never be a realist and should never be so silly as to want to be one. But it did not seem to me that Professor Montague meant that. What he did mean, I prefer, however, to let him say for himself. For pragmatism, the world is real, and *idea* and *object* are not single, but dual, because for pragmatism knowing is *not* creating. A dualistic epistemology can not be denied pragmatism because idea and object obviously *fuse* into one in every case of valid knowing. The two terms which pragmatism uses indicate that pragmatism holds them to be two. But one, *idea,* is an instrument, the other *object,* is the goal or subject of the instrument's function. That they may be and in most cases are partly, or even wholly, identical in quality and diverse in number, that the numerical diversity reduces itself to numerical unity in every case of true knowing, is the central fact which makes possible *representative* knowledge in any sense of that hard-used word. The business of the *idea* is to eliminate itself, bringing you face to face with its object or some one of the object's implications or associates. In that consists its representative power. To say that it never does so and never can, seems to me contrary to fact; to say that because it does so objects must be declared unreal and its functional difference from the object denied, seems worse than oversight of fact; it seems inadvertent perversion of fact for the accommodation of theory.

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PROFESSOR SANTAYANA AND IMMORTALITY

G. LOWES DICKINSON'S question "Is Immortality Desirable?," his own answer, and Professor Santayana's reply in this JOURNAL,[1] give an unusual opportunity for suggesting a point of view which does not seem to have been so far considered. From this standpoint we may gladly accept Professor Santayana's protest against a radically false ideal—fostered, if not created, by current linguistic usage—in the desire for *im*mortality.

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[1] Vol. VI., p. 411.

It seems to me that our prevailing worship of the "not": the not-final (infinite), the not-mortal (immortal), and all the rest, is a symptom of unnoticed perversion in customary expression which tends to foster barren controversy and to defeat beforehand all positive solution. The prefixes "in-" and "im-," indeed, are indifferently used in the concentrative, and the negating, or subtracting, senses: and we little realize how much perplexity, discordance of ideal, fruitless discussion, even suicidal despair, is formented, if not created, by modes of expression of which this is only one among many examples which vitiate our inferences, by sub-suggestion of which we are unconscious. On the other hand, they tend, of course, to favor illusion which may become delirious obsession, too often take on a poetic or devout form which may "deceive the very elect," and must always tend to the waste of our capacity to discuss the ideal expressed by Professor Santayana as that of "continual perfection." That ideal implies that we, who in this life use, as well as possess, body and mind, should not allow our working ideal to sink below the constant to the ephemeral, but recognize and confess that the result or good of us, whether that of example or achievement, of direct service or indirect influence, can not be a mere casual incident "leaving no wrack" of effect behind, but is presumably an operative though secret witness to the undying reality of that which urges men to do, to dare, even to die for the right, the true, the good —the real.

But there is another danger lurking in the current preconceptions on the subject of "immortality." We are the unconscious victims of this permitted persistence of outworn or perverted expression, in an undetected confusion between authentic and originative identity, and personality or self. The present (prevailing) ideal of the permanence of a mere self which at best is a working means and medium of a cosmic *identicating* energy happily beyond our present resources of definition, "freezes" me also "to the marrow." "Individual perpetuity," like unchanging bodily or material preservation of what is significantly called a mummy, would belong to the non-living and at most be a travesty of life. Individual potency is but as an egg-shell to be broken, though indispensable to the yolk which in its turn is food for an inestimable, because living, ovum. And, moreover, the not-dividual gives us nothing. The negative prefix here again betrays the vacuity of mere denial, however useful in its proper context it may be.

We can not yet impartially estimate life, but we can at least abstain from using its astonishing offspring mind, and mind's prerogative, speech, to confuse, deform and degrade, while thinking to enrich, economize or reverence, its unique issue, articulate and logical expression. See how idly content we are with our merely "infinite" ideals, and with our worship of an enthroned and despotic self—one of which, indeed, when it asserts itself in an octopian voracity, we have the grace to be ashamed and to repudiate as engendering selfishness or egotism—terms which are instinctively—and happily—always depreciative and sometimes contemptuous. Note the usage wherein we lightly confound I or we as the expression of an indefinable possessive identity, and my or our self, thus confessed as a property or possession, a temporary and modifiable entity which we insist on stereotyping as well as putting in the saddle—the most tyrannous of things—to ride us. Mixed metaphor seems excusable if not appropriate here. Where else do we so fatally confound the plain and elementary distinction between the *is* and the *has?* It may be hoped that we shall not much longer be content with an identity which rests on, or is the source of, a grammatical confusion between what we are and thus can not merely *have,* or have and thus can not fully *be.*

We may gladly, therefore, echo the protest against finding our own person again beyond the grave. As we say nowadays, it is not good enough. We praise, indeed, forms of unselfishness and sacrifice which are too often waste of beneficent capital, of a store laid up in us and bringing a hundredfold for all of us in each of us. We are liable to squander under ethical names personal resources which are here ours, "lent us" for intelligent and discriminative, economical as well as devoted and whole-hearted—service. Such an ennobling service we may well assume to be the contribution of the human factor to the cosmic whole, since science discovers no ultimate waste or vagary in the order of nature. There every form of order serves every other, and reveals itself to an ever-growing knowledge as inexorably consistent, while still making room for the spontaneity of life and its ever-increasing control—through loyalty to that order and consistency as the preconception of all worth or value —by an ideally dominating and even creative mind.

I would suggest that this confusion of the *is* and the *has* lies hidden at the root of Professor Santayana's condemnation of the cult or even toleration of pain, loss, grief, or privation, for their own sake. And "my own person" stands for our own self's cravings which we translate into an idolized "happiness," the wooden idol of *luckiness* set on a sacred throne of well-faring and well-being. The mayhap, what merely happens, thus glorified, is really at best but a wayside episode, never a final goal. And happiness is but the sum of such trivialities, or at most but the noonday interval of rest or play. It lacks the consecrating halo of blessing, even of joy.

It will be seen that I am here protesting against usages which secretly and insidiously depreciate our most vital credit—that expression which should be the articulate offspring of normal and healthy experience, fruit of a conception corresponding in mind to that of a living organism. There is no fact reached in any laboratory faithfully used, which does not in some sense tend to disperse the perverted ignorance shirking full truth in optimism, or shutting down its light in pessimism. We live in a self-created world of halfness, and we endow with this the heavenly, the holy, world of wholeness. We are always splitting and sundering that which must never be confounded, but also must never be dismembered. Our instrument of expression is thus become discordant at its very source; and we little as yet realize the tremendous power, the coercive tyranny, which a stale, a deformed, a casual, or an overgrown language may, without our suspicion of its secret betrayals, exert.

There is but one way of realizing this power and of turning it into fertilizing instead of destructive channels. At long last we must recognize that the most precious as the most pregnant function we have is that of reading, testing, translating, applying—significance. Here also the experimental method is, in fact, the introduction to the power which shall significate all experience and all the worlds that crowd at its door clamoring for welcome and interpretation, and thus for the adult privilege of righting the warped ideas and couching the veiled eyes of man's still partly abortive mind.

Thus we shall no longer suppose nature to be "opaque and overwhelming," but find her actively forwarding conscious aims and "perfectly transparent"; worthy, indeed, of the sacred name of mother, and looking to her children to right the wrongs which deflect the pure currents of endeavor, and which at present we actually charge upon her; thus contradicting ourselves in making her an unnatural "mother." Then indeed we shall no longer represent, in Professor Santayana's pungent words, the effects of the "clumsy conjunction of an automaton with a ghost," but a divine marriage through which a new and holy world is to be born.

All this, I am ready to confess, has a sound of empty and risky rhetoric. And I should be the last to claim that I have given my thesis a worthy expression, even as now possible. But we shall all admit that apart from personal failing, symbols, in outliving their original relevance and implication, act as subtle poisoners instead of servers of our thought, and become the prolific sources of barren dialectic or of emotional wandering.

Once more, this fact plainly calls for a determined, vigorous, and reasoned effort to insure that language shall become to us—and still more to our children—at least as loyal a servant and as rich a mine as the splendid instruments, each surpassing the last, by which in physical science we mechanically extend the limits of our sense-response, the borders of our knowledge, and our domination of our destiny. Neglecting this supreme need and treasure, we deserve to find life baffling and cruel, and even the instigator of a cynical or suicidal impulse which is the greatest and in fact the most extravagant of paradoxes.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Philosophy of Kant Explained. JOHN WATSON. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons. 1908. Pp. xi + 515.

This work consists of six parts: (1) an "Historical Retrospect," commentaries to (2) the "Critique of Pure Reason," (3) the "Metaphysic of Morality," (4) the "Critique of Practical Reason," and (5) the "Critique of Judgment," and (6) some "Supplementary Extracts from the Critique of Judgment." The "Historical Retrospect" is an exposition and criticism of the systems of those philosophers who came just before Kant and whose thought led up to the problems of the critical philosophy. The views of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, Locke, and Hume, are all discussed by way of an introduction to Kant's system. The commentaries to the three critiques and to the "Metaphysic of Morality" follow very closely, paragraph for paragraph, Watson's own volume on "The Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his own Writings" (first published in 1888), each paragraph in the "Extracts" being explained in the commentaries. In only a few cases is any reference made to any part of Kant's writings not in the "Extracts." The "Supplementary Extracts from the Critique of Judgment" are simply intended as a supplement to "The Philosophy of Kant in Extracts." They include the "Analytic of the Beautiful," §§ 1–6, 8–13, 15, 18–21, the "Analytic of the Sublime," §§ 23–31, 36–38, and the "Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment," §§ 56–57. They form a valuable addition to the earlier work.

Watson makes no attempt at criticism except in the "Historical Retrospect." In explaining the purpose of his book in the prefatory note, he says, these explanations of Kant "are not intended as a substitute for Kant's own words, but as a commentary upon them, though they will be found to contain a fairly complete account of his philosophy." They do not, however, form a commentary of the usual sort. Though the text of Kant is followed and each point is considered as it comes up as in most commentaries, there are few cross-references and few explanations by comparison with other parts of Kant. Each paragraph of the text is considered. In some cases there is little more than a lucid restatement of the paragraph in question; in other cases a more detailed account of the relations involved in Kant's thought is given. For instance, in regard to the *schema* Kant says, "In itself a schema is merely a product of